Current status: Hugo accepted the ten corrections after this dated review. A later GitHub evidence follow-up resolves three access flags and places OpenKP in Expands at 10/12. Other evidence limits remain. See checklist decisions.
HugoScore agency checklist review
Model: GPT-6 Astra. Vendor: OpenAI. Date: 2026-10-30.
The checklist needs corrections and evidence repairs before it can be treated as independently confirmed. I dispute ten answers across nine tools. OpenKP's Q12 should be no under the written advertising rule, reducing its recorded score from 10 to 9 and its zone from Expands to Leans expands. The other proposed changes leave their existing zones unchanged. All 57 result rows pass the mechanical count, self-start and Q11-cap checks, but source applicability and geographic normalization are uneven. I checked all twelve answers for each requested confirmation tool; 18 answers remain UNVERIFIED because the deciding documentation was prohibited or inaccessible. This is a public-document review, not a product test, a clinical evaluation, or human verification by Hugo.
| Tool | Question | Current | My answer | Reason | Public source and exact passage |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OpenKP | 12 | yes | no | Claude consumer policy documents targeted advertising. Training alone is Q10, but advertising defeats Q12. | source ap |
| VisitRecall | 10 | yes | no | The no-training promise names Anthropic only. No equivalent operator promise or opt-out is documented. | source vpsource vt |
| VisitRecall | 12 | yes | no | Website advertising cookies and ad-click reporting count under the written any-advertising rule. | source vp |
| My Doctor Friend* | 10 | yes | no | Provider-only training restriction leaves the operator's own model-training protection undocumented. | source mcsource mpsource mt |
| CureWise* | 7 | yes | no | The cited correction right is conditioned on location and applicable law. | source cp |
| Savva* | 12 | yes | no | SMS terms document promotional offers. Consent does not exempt advertising under Q12. | source ss |
| Wysa* | 9 | yes | no | For the combined scope, reset excludes Medical Assistant/Co-Pilot data and institution-controlled retention remains. | source wp |
| Advoca* | 7 | yes | no | Output rectification is stated under UK/EU rights; California adds another regional right, not a universal one. | source ad |
| No Barrier | 5 | no | yes | Terms require offering the patient another method. This is mandatory rather than an optional deployer setting. | source nb |
| K Health | 9 | yes | no | The cited deletion right is restricted to residents covered by state privacy laws. | source kh |
An asterisk means conflicted: OpenAI model in role record. It labels every comment about that tool throughout this review. This applies to My Doctor Friend, CureWise, Wysa and Advoca as specified in the request. I also apply it to Savva, whose reviewed scope includes an optional OpenAI provider. It does not mean OpenAI powers every configuration. The same disclosure applies below to OwnChart's optional OpenAI path, MAIA's recorded optional/fallback paths, Abridge's disclosed OpenAI work, Dragon Copilot's recorded Azure OpenAI component, and comments on Avie, CareClinic, ChatGPT Health and Belong. These comments should not be treated as independent confirmation of OpenAI.
The source notes below contain URLs, exact excerpts and access modes. References in the tables point to those notes. A no based on missing documentation is not an allegation that the operator actually does the undisclosed thing. In particular, the two Q10 disputes identify incomplete protection, not observed training.
1. Required cross-vendor confirmation
CONFIRMED means the recorded yes/no is supported under the written checklist, with the stated scope and caveats. DISPUTED means I recommend the replacement answer in the opening table. UNVERIFIED is necessary where I could not read the deciding source; assigning either requested label there would invent a finding. No unverified answer has been silently converted to no. Public documentation can confirm a documented claim, not actual implementation.
All judgments use the recorded function. A self-started optional tool passes Q5 under the adopted normalization. Q8 asks for a copy of data, recording or output, not necessarily an exhaustive export. A generic privacy contact can support Q7 when the right actually encompasses the relevant data, but location-dependent rights do not become universal merely because the policy applies worldwide.
OwnChart*
conflicted: OpenAI model in role record. The public site advertises OpenAI as an optional provider; the claimed shipped Anthropic-only default could not be independently checked.
| Q | Recorded | Review | Reason and source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | yes | CONFIRMED | Home identifies AI research use. source oc |
| 2 | yes | UNVERIFIED | Maintainer attribution and shipped default are in prohibited GitHub sources. source op |
| 3 | yes | CONFIRMED | Patient installs and controls the server. source oc |
| 4 | yes | CONFIRMED | Patient chooses questions. source oc |
| 5 | yes | CONFIRMED | Optional self-started use; AI is off by default. source ocsource op |
| 6 | yes | CONFIRMED | Saved AI conversations and audit records are described. source oc |
| 7 | yes | CONFIRMED | Published user-correction mechanism covers derived facts; no runtime test. source oc |
| 8 | yes | CONFIRMED | Patient holds the records on their own disk; specific export UI unverified. source op |
| 9 | yes | CONFIRMED | Server teardown deletes the local record; provider copies are a separate limitation. source op |
| 10 | yes | UNVERIFIED | API no-training protection verified; actual shipped API configuration is unverified. source acsource op |
| 11 | yes | CONFIRMED | Personal noncommercial self-hosting expressly permitted; not an OSI license claim. source ocsource op |
| 12 | yes | UNVERIFIED | Project-side protection documented; applicable shipped host route remains unverified. source opsource ac |
OpenKP
| Q | Recorded | Review | Reason and source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | yes | CONFIRMED | Public page identifies the AI assistant. source kp |
| 2 | no | UNVERIFIED | Named author evidence is in prohibited GitHub documentation; no contrary finding. source kp |
| 3 | yes | CONFIRMED | Patient runs it using their own portal credentials. source kp |
| 4 | yes | CONFIRMED | Patient asks the record questions. source kp |
| 5 | yes | CONFIRMED | Optional portal adjunct; self-start normalization applies. source kp |
| 6 | yes | CONFIRMED | Public examples show answers in the patient's client. source kp |
| 7 | no | UNVERIFIED | Public page documents write confirmation; full cited output-challenge documentation was prohibited. source kp |
| 8 | yes | CONFIRMED | Individual Claude chat export supplies a qualifying copy; replace GitHub-only citation. source ae |
| 9 | yes | CONFIRMED | Host conversation deletion documented; does not establish deletion of every local artifact. source ap |
| 10 | yes | CONFIRMED | Consumer training opt-out exists; safety and submitted-feedback exceptions remain. source ap |
| 11 | yes | CONFIRMED | Local patient-run software with noncommercial permission is documented. source kp |
| 12 | yes | DISPUTED | Yes to no. Host targeted marketing fails the written any-advertising rule. source ap |
Your Healthcare Agent
| Q | Recorded | Review | Reason and source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | yes | CONFIRMED | Setup explicitly places the patient in Claude. source ys |
| 2 | yes | CONFIRMED | Public About names Nick Dawson; Anthropic host identity is public. source yasource ap |
| 3 | yes | CONFIRMED | Patient sets up the project and supplies instructions. source ys |
| 4 | yes | CONFIRMED | Patient describes the problem; healthcare domain limits alone do not defeat Q4. source ys |
| 5 | yes | CONFIRMED | Optional self-started assistance; no care contingent on it is documented. source ys |
| 6 | yes | CONFIRMED | Patient reads the agent's direct chat response. source yssource yh |
| 7 | no | CONFIRMED | No output-specific correction route found in public spec; host rule expressly covers Q8-12. source yh |
| 8 | yes | CONFIRMED | Individual Claude export documents a copy; compiled note incorrectly limits host evidence. source ae |
| 9 | yes | CONFIRMED | Claude conversation deletion is independently documented. source ap |
| 10 | yes | CONFIRMED | Consumer opt-out available, with safety and feedback exceptions. source ap |
| 11 | yes | CONFIRMED | Instructions are copyable and forkable; transferability is documented, not tested. source yssource ya |
| 12 | no | CONFIRMED | Keep no, but replace training rationale with targeted-marketing evidence. source ap |
VisitRecall
| Q | Recorded | Review | Reason and source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | yes | CONFIRMED | Documented in-app consent precedes transmission to Anthropic. source vp |
| 2 | yes | CONFIRMED | Terms name VisitRecall Inc.; privacy names Anthropic. source vtsource vp |
| 3 | yes | CONFIRMED | Consumer-initiated app use described; historical recording function is now closed. source vtsource vm |
| 4 | yes | CONFIRMED | Patient chooses questions and records; do not describe closed recording as available. source vpsource vm |
| 5 | yes | CONFIRMED | Optional self-started app and documented ability to stop. source vt |
| 6 | yes | CONFIRMED | Wind-down export includes summaries, Q&A and original transcript text. source vm |
| 7 | yes | CONFIRMED | Correction right applies to collected summaries; privacy email is the request route. source vp |
| 8 | yes | CONFIRMED | Readable and JSON export documented through December 31, 2026. source vm |
| 9 | yes | CONFIRMED | Deletion route documented in policy and wind-down page. source vpsource vm |
| 10 | yes | DISPUTED | Yes to no: provider prohibition alone does not document VisitRecall's own no-training rule or opt-out. source vpsource vt |
| 11 | no | CONFIRMED | Export documented; continuing the same AI function elsewhere is not. source vm |
| 12 | yes | DISPUTED | Yes to no: website advertising and ad-platform reporting are expressly documented. source vp |
My Doctor Friend*
conflicted: OpenAI model in role record.
| Q | Recorded | Review | Reason and source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | yes | CONFIRMED | Terms disclose generated answers. source mt |
| 2 | yes | CONFIRMED | Operator and OpenAI, Anthropic and Google are named. source mpsource mt |
| 3 | yes | CONFIRMED | Reviewed scope is the patient-held consumer tool. source mc |
| 4 | yes | CONFIRMED | Patient chooses questions and record use. source mh |
| 5 | yes | CONFIRMED | Self-started consumer scope; account can be deleted. source mcsource mt |
| 6 | yes | CONFIRMED | Answers go directly to the patient. source mh |
| 7 | yes | CONFIRMED | Privacy correction request and persistent record correction form a documented route; outcome not guaranteed. source mpsource mh |
| 8 | yes | CONFIRMED | Global portability email route; clinician page also describes PDF export. source mpsource mc |
| 9 | yes | CONFIRMED | Account deletion and processing timetable are documented. source mp |
| 10 | yes | DISPUTED | Yes to no: provider training ban does not establish the operator's own prohibition or opt-out. source mcsource mpsource mt |
| 11 | no | CONFIRMED | Consumer app with export, no documented independent execution or equivalent-provider transfer. source mt |
| 12 | no | CONFIRMED | No retained as not documented: de-identified sharing lacks a non-revenue limitation, not proof of sale. source mp |
CureWise*
conflicted: OpenAI model in role record.
| Q | Recorded | Review | Reason and source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | yes | CONFIRMED | Public interface examples and model comparison disclose AI. source ch |
| 2 | yes | CONFIRMED | Operator policy plus Cross-Check identifies model makers; default model still unspecified. source cpsource ch |
| 3 | yes | CONFIRMED | Patient connects health systems and starts conversations. source ch |
| 4 | yes | CONFIRMED | Patient selects questions and communication preferences. source ch |
| 5 | yes | CONFIRMED | Optional self-started navigator, not a required care channel. source ch |
| 6 | yes | CONFIRMED | Own summary and model answers are displayed. source ch |
| 7 | yes | DISPUTED | Yes to no: cited correction right is location-dependent; no universal output-challenge route found. source cp |
| 8 | yes | CONFIRMED | Replace conditional privacy-right citation with documented shareable answers; Q8 permits output copies. source ch |
| 9 | yes | CONFIRMED | Separate Data Retention paragraph permits account/data deletion requests without the geographic preamble. source cp |
| 10 | no | CONFIRMED | No model-training prohibition or opt-out established in reviewed privacy terms. source cp |
| 11 | no | CONFIRMED | Hosted navigator; shareable answers do not establish same-function portability. source chsource cp |
| 12 | no | CONFIRMED | Advertising expressly documented. source cp |
Savva*
conflicted: OpenAI model in role record. The policy includes OpenAI among optional cloud providers.
| Q | Recorded | Review | Reason and source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | yes | CONFIRMED | Cloud-first-use consent names provider and data; local AI is advertised. source spsource sh |
| 2 | yes | CONFIRMED | Vircode operator and selected cloud providers are named in policy. source sp |
| 3 | yes | CONFIRMED | Patient installs and selects connections and provider. source spsource sw |
| 4 | yes | CONFIRMED | Patient chooses model and question. source sw |
| 5 | yes | CONFIRMED | Self-started; cloud opt-in can be withdrawn and local use remains. source sp |
| 6 | yes | CONFIRMED | Chat and generated record summaries are patient features. source sh |
| 7 | no | CONFIRMED | No output-challenge procedure documented; generic conditional rights do not supply one. source sp |
| 8 | yes | CONFIRMED | Exports are a free feature. source sh |
| 9 | yes | CONFIRMED | Local app deletion and health-data controls independently support yes despite conditional legal-rights section. source sp |
| 10 | yes | CONFIRMED | Question data limited to requested inference; provider training prohibited by stated agreements. source sp |
| 11 | yes | CONFIRMED | On-device models meet written local-execution alternative; cloud relay is not independently runnable. source swsource sp |
| 12 | yes | DISPUTED | Yes to no under broad Q12: support SMS terms include promotional offers, even though opt-in. source ss |
Fight Health Insurance
| Q | Recorded | Review | Reason and source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | yes | CONFIRMED | AI appeal drafting is explicit. source fasource fh |
| 2 | yes | CONFIRMED | Corporate operator named; Google identifies MedGemma. Original ai.google.dev link is broken. source ftsource fasource mg |
| 3 | yes | CONFIRMED | Patient initiates upload and appeal. source fh |
| 4 | yes | CONFIRMED | Patient selects denial and controls the letter sent. source fhsource fa |
| 5 | yes | CONFIRMED | Self-started assistance; no care depends on its use. source fh |
| 6 | yes | CONFIRMED | Patient sees generated drafts. source fh |
| 7 | yes | CONFIRMED | Generated drafts can be edited before submission. source fhsource fa |
| 8 | yes | CONFIRMED | Editable appeal can be submitted by patient; this is an output copy, unlike a conditional privacy right. source fh |
| 9 | yes | CONFIRMED | Public AI page offers deletion requests at any time. source fa |
| 10 | no | CONFIRMED | Binding terms permit training; no complete opt-out established despite contrary AI-page claim. source ftsource fa |
| 11 | yes | UNVERIFIED | Public mostly-open-source claim found; runnable license/setup evidence is on prohibited GitHub. source fa |
| 12 | no | CONFIRMED | Interest-based advertising documented. source fp |
MAIA*
conflicted: OpenAI model in role record. The supplied record includes OpenAI among optional/fallback routes; the configuration itself remains unverified.
| Q | Recorded | Review | Reason and source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | yes | UNVERIFIED | Deciding evidence is on prohibited GitHub, or depends on that configuration; no independent confirmation. |
| 2 | no | UNVERIFIED | Deciding evidence is on prohibited GitHub, or depends on that configuration; no independent confirmation. |
| 3 | yes | UNVERIFIED | Deciding evidence is on prohibited GitHub, or depends on that configuration; no independent confirmation. |
| 4 | yes | UNVERIFIED | Deciding evidence is on prohibited GitHub, or depends on that configuration; no independent confirmation. |
| 5 | yes | UNVERIFIED | Deciding evidence is on prohibited GitHub, or depends on that configuration; no independent confirmation. |
| 6 | yes | UNVERIFIED | Deciding evidence is on prohibited GitHub, or depends on that configuration; no independent confirmation. |
| 7 | yes | UNVERIFIED | Cited public Privacy.md did not load. |
| 8 | yes | UNVERIFIED | Deciding evidence is on prohibited GitHub, or depends on that configuration; no independent confirmation. |
| 9 | yes | UNVERIFIED | Deciding evidence is on prohibited GitHub, or depends on that configuration; no independent confirmation. |
| 10 | yes | UNVERIFIED | DigitalOcean host promise read; MAIA's binding to that configuration cannot be verified. source dp |
| 11 | yes | UNVERIFIED | Deciding evidence is on prohibited GitHub, or depends on that configuration; no independent confirmation. |
| 12 | yes | UNVERIFIED | Deciding evidence is on prohibited GitHub, or depends on that configuration; no independent confirmation. |
Wysa*
conflicted: OpenAI model in role record.
| Q | Recorded | Review | Reason and source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | yes | CONFIRMED | Policy documents AI conversation and consent. source wp |
| 2 | yes | CONFIRMED | Operator policy and service-provider list identify model suppliers. source wpsource ws |
| 3 | no | CONFIRMED | Keep no for compiled combined scope; institutional pathways prevent a universal yes. source wp |
| 4 | no | CONFIRMED | Keep no for combined scope; fixed referral/care pathways and operator-selected content. source wp |
| 5 | no | CONFIRMED | No universal right to decline institutional AI while preserving service established. source wp |
| 6 | yes | CONFIRMED | Conversation responses and reports reach the patient. source wp |
| 7 | yes | CONFIRMED | Policy promises to change conversation when patient reports it unhelpful. source wp |
| 8 | yes | CONFIRMED | Global copy-request route documented. source wp |
| 9 | yes | DISPUTED | Yes to no for combined scope: reset excludes Medical Assistant and Co-Pilot data; retention is institution-controlled. source wp |
| 10 | no | CONFIRMED | Own-model use of anonymous conversations/preferences remains documented. source wp |
| 11 | no | CONFIRMED | Data transfer is offered, not independent execution of the same function. source wp |
| 12 | no | CONFIRMED | Meta advertising campaigns are explicitly documented. source ws |
For Wysa* Q9, this is a scope judgment. The policy also permits deletion requests when data is no longer needed. That conditional route does not establish deletion across the recorded institutional scope; a consumer-only row could retain yes.source wp
OpenKP Q12 ruling
Opus's distinction is correct: permission to train belongs in Q10 and, by itself, does not establish advertising, sale or licensing under Q12. Nevertheless, OpenKP's recorded yes is wrong for the reviewed Claude Desktop consumer path. Anthropic's consumer privacy policy documents sharing personal data for targeted marketing of its own products. Q12 expressly rejects any documented advertising, including with consent and including the patient's AI host. An opt-out does not rescue Q12, although it can satisfy Q10. Your Healthcare Agent's Q12 therefore stays no, but its training-based explanation should be replaced with the marketing evidence. This uses the same broad standard as Wysa's external ad campaigns and VisitRecall's website advertising.source apsource wssource vp
This is not a claim that Claude sells medical conversations or inserts ads into answers. If Hugo intends to exclude acquisition advertising or optional product promotions, Q12 needs a prospective wording change followed by consistent recoding. OpenKP should receive the same rule as every other tool, regardless of Hugo's authorship. The published OpenKP page distinguishes the local server from the assistant receiving record content; local execution alone does not establish local model inference.source kp
Evidence qualifications affecting confirmation
VisitRecall's recording function closed on September 30; the confirmation concerns its historical function and current wind-down exports, not availability to new users.source vm
The Q10 disputes concern the application operators, separately from their model providers. VisitRecall's service-limited license does not explicitly settle training; apply the same evidence threshold to My Doctor Friend*.source vtsource mc
Savva's* marketing says cloud queries avoid a Savva server, but its policy describes a relay and brief answer retention. Use the policy's data-flow description.source swsource sp
2. The four normalizations
I screened all 57 compiled entries, their answer notes and all 57 result rows. The following separates arithmetic checks from source-based findings; it is not a claim that I independently verified all 684 answers.
| Normalization | Audit result |
|---|---|
| Self-started Q3 yes plus no dependent care gives Q5 yes | Every recorded Q3 yes has Q5 yes. No missed mechanical application found. This does not independently prove every Q3 classification. |
| Host terms count for Q8-12 | Inconsistent evidence and explanations. OpenKP Q12 needs correction; Your Healthcare Agent Q8 needs a host-export citation and its Q12 needs a new rationale. Fetch My Epic Token credits an AI pathway but supplies core-utility-only evidence for host data controls. |
| Rights available only in some places count as no | Missed in CureWise Q7, Advoca Q7 and K Health Q9. Other conditional citations have independent support and should be repaired rather than automatically downgraded. |
| Expands requires Q11 | All seven recorded Expands entries have Q11 yes. All recorded scores of 10 or more with Q11 no are capped. The cap is mechanically correct; several underlying Q11 claims remain unverified. |
The mechanical findings come from the supplied local CHECKLIST.md, DECISIONS-PENDING-PUBLICATION.md, compiled-answers.json and RESULTS-ALL.md. They are findings about those artifacts, not vendor claims requiring a public URL.
Missed geography cases. CureWise's policy scope does not override the conditional preamble to its correction rights. Advoca's actual output-rectification promise is under a UK/EU heading, with a separate California right, and no universal equivalent was found. K Health's deletion passage is in the state-law supplement, not an unrestricted deletion commitment.source cpsource adsource kh
Preserve independently supported yes answers. CureWise Q8 has a product-page promise of shareable answers, and its Q9 has a separate deletion-request provision. Advoca* Q8/Q9 have a homepage export/deletion promise. Savva* Q8/Q9 have exports and local deletion. OpenKP and Your Healthcare Agent have an individual-user Claude export route, which is stronger evidence than geographically conditional portability language. Fight Health Insurance offers an editable letter for patient submission and a separate deletion route. These are source repairs, not additional disputed answers.source chsource cpsource ahsource shsource spsource aesource fhsource fa
Additional screening found an unrestricted deletion-request paragraph for Virta, an access-request paragraph for Trialscreen, and a general copy/deletion section for Belong*. They should not lose credit merely because another section describes legal exceptions. Avie's* general request wording is not expressly geographic, though the boundary between data correction and output challenge still needs definition. AI Doctor Scan and Chronilogix frame rights in legal terms without an explicit residency-only preamble; I did not infer an unstated geographic exclusion. Chronilogix also documents user-directed conversation deletion.source visource trsource besource avsource ascsource chr
Fetch My Epic Token. Its HowTo explicitly moves the patient into Gemini, while its core utility says it collects no personal information. That core statement cannot establish Gemini's practices. Gemini documents deletion and a training opt-out, with retention and safety exceptions, so Q9/Q10 can be supported with replacement host citations rather than a blanket no-retention claim. Q12 is not independently confirmed here: Gemini says chats are not used to show ads, which is narrower than the complete Q12 test. I did not infer sale of health data from Google's unrelated advertising operations. Fix the function boundary and the host evidence before certifying its Expands placement.source fesource fepsource gp
Evidence completeness. In compiled-answers.json, 38 yes answers have an absent or empty quote: ChatGPT Health* Q1-10; Ari Q1 and Q3-10; Avie* Q2 and Q5-9; CareClinic* Q1-10; Your Healthcare Agent Q5/Q8; OpenKP Q5. Some have normalization notes or URLs, but they do not meet the checklist's exact-excerpt requirement as stored. This is an artifact-quality finding, not 38 unsupported claims of adverse product behavior or 38 proposed answer reversals. Your Healthcare Agent Q8 also retains a not-documented basis and a stale note limiting host evidence to Q9/Q10 despite the normalized yes. Repair the deciding evidence before publication.
3. The extremes
These are results of the proposed changes applied to the current counts, not replacement coding files. Unverified source-dependent answers retain their current value for arithmetic only.
| Tool | Recorded placement | Review outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Abridge* | 0, Constrains | No zone reversal established. Reviewed documents put the clinician/customer in control; precise model attribution and private contract protections remain unresolved. |
| Nabla | 0, Constrains | No zone reversal established. The consent script is an example, not a universal patient guarantee. Current terms describe clinician use, training and de-identified disclosure. |
| nVoq | 1, Constrains | No zone reversal established. Named proprietary engine supports Q2; data settings and opt-outs belong to the customer. |
| No Barrier | 1, Constrains | Q5 becomes yes: 2, still Constrains. |
| Dragon Copilot* | 2, Constrains | No zone reversal established. Clinician review and customer-controlled rights do not create direct universal patient controls. |
| K Health | 2, Constrains | Q9 becomes no: 1, still Constrains for the compiled combined scope. |
| OwnChart* | 12, Expands | Conditional, not fully confirmed. Q2/Q10/Q12 remain unverified. |
| Savva* | 11, Expands | Q12 becomes no: 10, still Expands. |
| MAIA* | 11, Expands | Not confirmed. All twelve answer reviews are blocked or configuration-dependent. |
| Your Healthcare Agent | 10, Expands | 10 remains supported at document level with corrected host citations/rationale. |
| OpenKP | 10, Expands | Q12 becomes no: 9, Leans expands. Q2/Q7 additionally remain unverified. |
| Fight Health Insurance | 10, Expands | Not fully confirmed: Q11's runnable license/setup evidence could not be checked. |
| Fetch My Epic Token | 10, Expands | Not fully confirmed: host Q12 and the AI/core-utility scope must be resolved. |
Abridge*: its patient-data processing is governed by customer agreements, while public AI material puts review and revision in clinicians' hands. The public OpenAI announcement establishes a conflict disclosure but does not identify the model used for every scribe deployment. I do not turn a research/evaluation announcement into a universal deployed-model finding.source absource aisource ao
Nabla's June 22, 2026 terms were readable in the public browser after the web reader returned older French terms. Its patient-consent page is explicitly an example. Clinician review is documented, patient review of the unedited draft is not. The contract permits training on de-identified data and disclosure connected with the service. These support the current conservative reading, without establishing what every deployment actually does.source nasource nc
nVoq's February 26, 2026 SSA reserves data-retention settings and training-use switches to the customer. Its BAA routes access and amendment through the covered entity. Its FAQ names ClinicalCore as its proprietary engine. The distinction between a patient request through a legally obligated provider and an optional institution setting should be made clearer in the rubric, but I did not recode these as direct patient control.source nvsource nvbsource nvs
No Barrier's section 7.3 requires another-method choice, contradicting the compiled statement that no patient decline right is documented. That supports Q5 at document level, not a tested equivalence of interpreter quality. Its section 4 allows perpetual de-identified use and sale of summary data, so the security page's broader promise cannot resolve Q10/Q12 in the patient's favor. BAA-specific overrides remain unverified.source nbsource nssource ni
Dragon Copilot*: the privacy white paper explicitly returns drafts to clinicians, describes anonymized model training, and places consent-revocation purging through customer support initiated by the customer. The May 2026 DPA supplies processing restrictions relevant to Q12, subject to its stated exceptions. Internal improvement alone is not a Q12 advertising/sale finding. No change to the current zone is warranted from the sources read.source drsource dd
K Health combines institutional intake, virtual care and PatientGPT. AHA describes optional patient-initiated conversations and patient-shareable summaries for the Hartford PatientGPT pilot. The combined row should not be presented as a score for PatientGPT alone. Splitting that deployment requires a fresh function-specific assessment, not importing favorable fragments into the broad row.source kasource kh
4. Method review and concrete wording changes
The checklist measures documented opportunities for patient control, but its total does not yet reliably answer whose interests a tool serves. The following are proposed rule changes, not retroactive rules used to manufacture score changes.
- Freeze one configuration. Add: “Assess one function, deployment, plan, jurisdiction and model route per row. State whether it is active or historical.” Wysa* and K Health combine unlike services; VisitRecall is winding down.source wpsource kasource vm
- Separate missing evidence from adverse behavior. Keep the conservative score if desired, but require a visible reason: “no, not documented”; “no, operator-controlled”; or “no, contrary documented practice.” Abridge's public policy expressly excludes patient Customer Data, which is an evidence boundary, not proof of every possible misuse.source ab
- Reduce Q3/Q5 double-counting. Q3 concerns who initiates use. Rewrite Q5: “After initiation or institutional application, can the patient revoke AI use without losing the underlying care/service, and is the alternative described?” Mark optional adjuncts as such; do not let the automatic normalization masquerade as tested refusal. No Barrier's contractual alternative shows why these are distinct questions.source nb
- Clarify Q4's purpose test. Rewrite: “Within the stated function, can the patient choose the question or task without being required to follow the operator's commercial or institutional objective?” A specialized appeal tool can still be patient-directed; a fixed subject area is not itself evidence of institutional steering.source fhsource fa
- Define Q7's minimum route. Rewrite: “A documented patient-initiated process accepts a correction or challenge to an identified AI output and states what happens next.” Separately record input-record edits, conversational feedback and consequential-decision review. VisitRecall's generic correction right and Wysa's* conversational adjustment are different controls.source vpsource wp
- Specify Q8/Q9 coverage. Record which artifacts are copyable/deletable: raw inputs, output, chats, derived profiles, backups and institution-held records. Add: “The positive route must apply throughout the scored deployment, with exceptions listed.” This prevents consumer reset from certifying Wysa's* institution-held data and allows CureWise's* output sharing to support Q8 honestly.source wpsource ch
- Fix Q10's logical ambiguity and actor coverage. Rewrite: “For every processor in the scored route, training on patient inputs, outputs and derived data is prohibited or subject to an effective patient-controlled opt-out; sale is addressed separately in Q12. List safety, feedback and de-identification exceptions.” A restriction on providers alone does not settle the application operator's practice.source mcsource vpsource ap
- Separate exit from technical self-hosting. Retain Q11 but report “local execution,” “self-hostable,” and “demonstrated equivalent migration” separately. Add documented requirements such as skills, account dependencies and model access. Export alone is not continued function, as VisitRecall's closure illustrates. Conversely, a local client does not make hosted inference local.source vmsource kp
- Define Q12's advertising boundary and add consequential-use rights. If the intent is the current broad test, explicitly include marketing sites, acquisition campaigns and optional promotional messages. If the intent is patient-data monetization or sponsored health advice, score those separately from product promotions. Also ask: “Can patients use their records and AI outputs to challenge providers, including complaints and legal proceedings?” VisitRecall restricts that use despite a high current agency score. Savva's* optional SMS offers and Anthropic acquisition marketing show why the advertising boundary matters.source vtsource sssource ap
Public-source register
All accesses were on 2026-10-30. Excerpts are exact short fragments from the indicated section; they are not substitutes for the surrounding scope and exceptions described above. Public web text means the web reader's returned page text, which can be cached. Rendered browser text was used where stated. No product controls were tested.
Source ap
Privacy policy, sections 2, 4 and 6. Exact passages: “sharing your personal data for targeted advertising to promote our products and services”; “unless you opt out”; “delete individual conversations”. Access: Public web text.
Source ae
Individual-user exports. Exact passage: “Data exports include conversation data and the user data for your account.”. Access: Public web text.
Source ac
Customer Content. Exact passage: “Anthropic may not train models on Customer Content from Services.”. Access: Public web text.
Source oc
Doctrine and AI features. Exact passages: “private AI research partner”; “Self-hosted on your hardware.”; “User correction is canonical”; “Conversations are saved.”; “You ask the questions.”. Access: Public web text.
Source op
Server software and Your rights. Exact passages: “Your data stays on your disk.”; “Delete everything by tearing down your server.”; “AI features are off by default”. Access: Public web text.
Source kp
Trust boundary, examples and install path. Exact passages: “your AI assistant”; “using your own credentials, on your own Mac”; “Source-available. Noncommercial license”; “Your assistant sees tool results”. Access: Public web text.
Source ys
Setup steps 2 and 4. Exact passages: “Copy the whole thing.”; “Now just describe your situation in plain language.”; “claude.ai”. Access: Rendered public browser text.
Source ya
The build and Who. Exact passages: “Designed and built with love by Nick Dawson in Bozeman, Montana.”; “Open source. Forkable. Improvable.”. Access: Rendered public browser text.
Source yh
Public instruction block and introduction. Exact passage: “Your Healthcare Agent”. Access: Rendered public browser text, including embedded specification; direct agent-spec.md retrieval failed.
Source vp
AI Processing, Your Rights and website advertising. Exact passages: “Anthropic is contractually prohibited”; “advertising cookies”; “Correct inaccurate data”; “AI-generated summaries”; “explicit consent within the app”; “To improve our services”. Access: Public web text.
Source vt
Sections 5, 7, 11 and 12. Exact passages: “VisitRecall, Inc.”; “against a healthcare provider”; “solely to provide the service”; “You may stop using VisitRecall at any time”. Access: Public web text.
Source vm
Closing notice and export descriptions. Exact passages: “The app will stop recording on September 30, 2026.”; “A JSON file with every field we store”; “including the raw transcript text”. Access: Public web text; no sign-in or form interaction.
Source mp
Sections 3, 4 and 6. Exact passages: “analytics, product development, or research”; “Access, correction, or portability”; “Delete Account”; “OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google”. Access: Public web text.
Source mc
Patient control and privacy. Exact passages: “our providers are contractually barred from training their own models on it”; “It’s a tool your patients hold, not a dashboard you manage.”. Access: Rendered public browser text.
Source mh
Patient questions and records. Exact passage: “Fix it once in My Doctor Friend. It stays fixed, even when your records update.”. Access: Rendered public browser text.
Source mt
Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5. Exact passages: “answers generated by artificial-intelligence models”; “for operating and promoting the Services”; “non-transferable license”. Access: Public web text.
Source cp
Your Rights and Choices; Data Retention; Cookies. Exact passages: “Depending on your location and applicable law”; “deletion of your account and data”; “Deliver relevant content and advertising”. Access: Rendered public browser text, policy dated October 28; web text initially returned an older version.
Source ch
Chat, summary and Cross-Check. Exact passages: “Shareable answers you can bring to your care team”; “Ask follow-up questions in your own words”; “Answers compared side by side”. Access: Public web text.
Source sp
Sections 6, 7, 11 and 12. Exact passages: “You can delete the Savva mobile app at any time.”; “Solely to generate the answer you asked for.”; “Cloud AI is off”. Access: Public web text.
Source sh
Free and Pro features. Exact passages: “All charts, all goals, all exports.”; “Cloud AI chat”; “On-device AI chat”; “AI-powered medical record summaries”. Access: Public web text.
Source sw
Sections 3 and 4. Exact passages: “Run models like Llama and Gemma entirely on-device with zero cloud exposure”; “never through a Savva server”. Access: Public web text.
Source ss
SMS Terms & Conditions. Exact passages: “product news or offers from time to time”; “Consent is not a condition of purchase.”. Access: Public web text.
Source fh
How It Works and submission. Exact passages: “Upload denial letter”; “AI creates multiple drafts you can edit.”; “Submit the appeal yourself for free”. Access: Public web text.
Source fa
How It Works, Training & Data, Open Source. Exact passages: “MedGemma”; “review and customize any generated appeal”; “request deletion of your data”; “No real patient appeal letters are used in training.”. Access: Public web text.
Source ft
Opening provisions. Exact passages: “Fight Health Insurance, Inc.”; “We also use the information you submit through the Services to train large language models”. Access: Public web text.
Source fp
Advertising and rights. Exact passage: “We also use Personal Information to conduct interest-based advertising”. Access: Public web text.
Source dp
Hosted model data privacy. Exact passage: “DigitalOcean does not use this data to train, retrain, or fine-tune any model”. Access: Public web text; verifies host promise, not MAIA's configuration.
Source wp
Sections 3, 4 and 9. Exact passages: “Get a Copy”; “We change our conversation”; “Co-pilot service will not be deleted”; “Reset my data”; “We might use some anonymous chats”. Access: Public web text.
Source ws
LLM and Meta rows. Exact passages: “OpenAI, Anthropic LLM, Google Gemini LLM”; “Meta Ads Manager”; “These campaigns will run on facebook and Instagram.”. Access: Public web text.
Source ad
Section 7. Exact passages: “Your Data Rights (UK and EU Users)”; “report any summary or transcript content as inaccurate and request rectification”. Access: Public web text.
Source ah
You own your data. Exact passage: “Export or delete it anytime”. Access: Public web text.
Source kh
U.S. State Privacy Notice. Exact passages: “For residents covered under the State Privacy Laws”; “You have the right to request the deletion”. Access: Public web text.
Source ka
PatientGPT pilot description. Exact passages: “patients who choose to consult AI”; “Providing conversation summaries that patients can send to clinicians”. Access: Public web text.
Source nb
Sections 4 and 7.3. Exact passages: “You shall offer the patients the option of using this Platform or another method”; “sale, transfer, and exploitation”; “on a perpetual basis”. Access: Public web text.
Source ns
Data use and retention. Exact passage: “We never train on, repurpose or sell your data”. Access: Public web text.
Source ni
Patient-facing interpretation. Exact passage: “the system displays visual aids helping patients understand conditions and procedures more clearly”. Access: Public web text.
Source na
Sections 3 and 9; attached BAA. Exact passages: “designed and intended to be used by healthcare professionals”; “training of Nabla’s internal artificial intelligence model”; “may disclose such de-identified data”. Access: Rendered public browser text, June 22, 2026; web reader initially returned older French terms.
Source nc
Example consent script. Exact passages: “Patient consent example”; “which I will review and edit for accuracy”. Access: Rendered public browser text; web retrieval failed.
Source nv
ClinicalCore AI and clinical workflow. Exact passages: “ClinicalCore AI™ is nVoq’s proprietary AI engine”; “clinician dictation or clinician-patient conversation”. Access: Public web text.
Source nvb
Sections 3.10.2 and 3.10.3, pages 3 and 4. Exact passage: “Covered Entity shall determine whether an individual is entitled to access his or her PHI”. Access: Direct public HTTP PDF, parsed in memory after web-reader failure; no saved PDF.
Source nvs
Sections 3.3, 6.2 and 6.3, pages 3 and 5. Exact passages: “Customer shall have sole responsibility”; “unless Customer elects to restrict use”; “any lawful purpose”. Access: Direct public HTTP PDF, parsed in memory after web-reader failure; no saved PDF.
Source dr
Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5. Exact passages: “The generated clinical documentation is returned to the clinician for review.”; “trained solely on anonymized data”; “a customer can log a ticket”. Access: Public web text; article body available despite generic authorization banner.
Source dd
Use and disclosure of processed data, May 2026 DPA. Exact passages: “advertising or similar commercial purposes”; “All processing of Processed Data is subject to Microsoft’s obligation of confidentiality”. Access: Direct public HTTP DOCX, XML parsed in memory after unsupported web-reader format; no saved DOCX.
Source ab
Applicability. Exact passages: “This Policy does not apply to the content that our customers”; “process your data solely on their instruction”. Access: Public web text.
Source ai
Control through intuitive UIs. Exact passage: “Our tools help clinicians review, fact-check, and revise AI-generated notes before signing off.”. Access: Public web text.
Source ao
April 22, 2026 announcement. Exact passage: “foundation models, like GPT-5.5, to power other features”. Access: Public web text.
Source fe
Gemini instructions. Exact passages: “Enter the following prompt into Google Gemini”; “Ask AI to analyze the results and look for anomalies.”. Access: Public web text.
Source fep
Privacy and license. Exact passages: “does not collect, retain, or distribute any personal information from the end user”; “MIT license”. Access: Public web text.
Source gp
Settings, retention and advertising. Exact passages: “Your Gemini Apps chats are not being used to show you ads.”; “Keep Activity”; “manually delete”; “not used to train”. Access: Public web text.
Source vi
Section 5. Exact passage: “Request Deletion: You may request that we delete your personal information.”. Access: Public web text.
Source tr
Access and consent withdrawal. Exact passage: “You may request access to the personal information we hold about you”. Access: Public web text.
Source be
Section 7. Exact passages: “If you would like, we can provide you all your Personal Information”; “deleting your Account from the Service”. Access: Rendered public browser text after web-reader HTTP 500.
Source av
Direitos do titular. Exact passage: “Titulares podem solicitar acesso, correção, portabilidade”. Access: Public web text in Portuguese.
Source asc
Your Rights (GDPR). Exact passage: “Under GDPR and other privacy laws, you have the following rights”. Access: Public web text.
Source chr
Sections V and VII. Exact passages: “Your conversational data is retained until you choose to delete it.”; “Under applicable data protection law”. Access: Public web text.
Source mg
MedGemma overview. Exact passage: “Google's most capable open models”. Access: Public web text.
Anything I could not check
- GitHub and raw.githubusercontent.com were not opened, including the cited OwnChart, OpenKP, Your Healthcare Agent, Fight Health Insurance and MAIA source files. Incidental search-result links were not followed or used as GitHub evidence. Public non-GitHub documentation supplied some substitute evidence, but not the 18 UNVERIFIED answers.
- MAIA's cited https://maia.agropper.xyz/Privacy.md did not load through the web reader, and browser navigation was blocked. I did not bypass it. No independent MAIA application findings or cross-vendor clearance should be inferred from the DigitalOcean host policy.
- OwnChart's shipped provider/default configuration, named-maintainer source, exact export implementation and code-level corrections; OpenKP's GitHub author and output-challenge evidence; Fight Health Insurance's actual self-hostable distribution/license boundary. Public claims are distinguished from unavailable implementation evidence in the tables.
- Full same-function migration, provider deletion after data leaves a local app, and all backup/retention exceptions were not tested.
- Fetch My Epic Token's complete host Q12 condition and runnable reproduction requirements were not established.
- VisitRecall's App Store seller attribution could not be independently confirmed. I used the public contract's operator identity and disclosed the wind-down.
- Private BAAs, deployed consent screens, institution-specific contracts and actual clinical workflows were not available. Abridge's precise deployed model and Nabla's request-only model card were not confirmed.
- The direct Your Healthcare Agent agent-spec.md request failed; its public embedded instruction block and rendered setup/about pages were readable. Nabla and Belong web-reader failures were recovered through public rendered pages. nVoq PDFs and Microsoft's DPA were recovered through public HTTP and parsed only in memory. Fight Health Insurance's MedGemma link returned 404; current official Google documentation was readable.
- The other tools received normalization/evidence screening, not a full independent 12-answer source replication. This review does not certify all 57 tools.
- No service was personally verified by Hugo or tested by this reviewer. No account, login, purchase, health-data submission, message to an operator, or product interaction was performed.
- Repository work was confined to /Users/hugooc/code/HugoScore. The attached project copy, earlier blind-review folders and BOUNDARY-CASES-2026-10-30.md were not opened for this review. Only this new review file was written; existing files and the website were not changed. Nothing was committed or pushed.